Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation by Mikhail Golosov et al.
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Research Department Staﬀ Report 293
September 2001
Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
Mikhail Golosov∗
University of Minnesota
and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Narayana Kocherlakota∗
University of Minnesota
and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Aleh Tsyvinski∗
University of Minnesota
and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we consider an environment in which agents’ skills are private information, are poten-
tially multi-dimensional, and follow arbitrary stochastic processes. We allow for arbitrary incentive-
compatible and physically feasible tax schemes. We prove that it is typically Pareto optimal to
have positive capital taxes. As well, we prove that in any given period, it is Pareto optimal to tax
consumption goods at a uniform rate.
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The modern economic analysis of optimal taxation takes two distinct forms. One line
of research emphasizes the eﬀects of taxation on capital accumulation (see Chari and Kehoe
(1999) for an excellent survey). The basic assumption is that a government faces a dynamic
Ramsey problem: it needs to fund a stream of purchases over time using linear taxes on
capital and labor income. The hallmark result of this literature is that it is optimal for the
government to set capital income tax rates to zero in the long run (Chamley (1986), Judd
(1985)).
A second branch of the literature is based on the work of Mirrlees (1971, 1976). Here,
the government has access to nonlinear taxation. However, agents have ﬁxed heterogeneous
skill levels that are unobservable to others. The goal of taxation in this setting becomes (in
part) one of transferring resources from the highly skilled to the less skilled in an eﬃcient
way, given that incomes but not skills are observable. An important lesson of this literature
is the uniform commodity taxation theorem of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980). It states
that if utility is weakly separable between consumption and leisure, then, despite the presence
of the incentive problem, it is socially optimal for all consumption goods to be taxed at the
same rate.
In this paper, we re-examine the zero capital taxation and uniform commodity tax-
ation theorems in the context of a large class of dynamic economies. We enlarge the class
of economies previously studied in two ways. We allow for multiple types of labor; corre-
spondingly, agents’ skills are multi-dimensional. More importantly, we allow skills to evolve
stochastically over time. We impose no restriction on the evolution of skills except that it
must be independent across agents.Besides enlarging the class of economies, we enlarge the choice set of the taxation
authority. We do not restrict attention to linear tax schemes (a la Ramsey) or piecewise
diﬀerentiable schemes (a la Mirrlees). Instead, we allow the taxation authority to use arbitrary
nonlinear tax schemes; in other words, it can achieve any incentive-compatible and physically
feasible allocation.
This general class of environments is technically challenging: it features both dynami-
cally evolving private information, and a multiple-dimensional type space. There is no known
way to develop a full characterization of the socially optimal allocations in this environment.
In particular, we might well obtain misleading answers if we were to simply substitute ﬁrst-
order conditions for the large number of incentive constraints, and then apply Lagrangian
methods.1
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, we reconsider the zero capital income taxation theorem.
We specialize the environment to have only one consumption good. We assume also that
utility is additively separable in consumption and leisure. We prove that in a Pareto optimal2
allocation, individual consumption satisﬁes a “reciprocal” intertemporal ﬁrst order condition





Here, Rt+1 is the marginal return to investment, u is the agent’s momentary utility function,
and β is the individual discount factor.
1Rogerson (1985b) provides suﬃcient conditions for the validity of the ﬁrst-order approach in a static
principal-agent context. However, there are no known generalizations of his conditions in dynamic settings.
2By Pareto optimal, we mean Pareto optimal relative to the set of all allocations that are both incentive-
compatible and physically feasible.
2This “reciprocal ﬁrst order condition” has an important consequence. If individual
marginal utility u0(ct+1) in a Pareto optimum is random from the point of view of period t,




(The incentive problem means that it is typically eﬃcient for individual consumption to be
stochastic: The planner needs to oﬀer more consumption to high skill types to get them to
work more.) We prove that (1) implies that if agents trade capital and consumption in a
sequence of competitive markets, it is optimal for tax rates on capital income to be positive.3
The intuition behind the inequality (1) (and the associated capital income tax result)
is as follows. Suppose society considers increasing investment by lowering an individual’s
period t consumption by ε and raising an individual’s period (t +1 )consumption by εRt+1.
Doing so has two immediate consequences on social welfare (measured in utiles): there is a
cost u0(ct)ε and a beneﬁt βεRt+1Etu0(ct+1). However, there is an additional adverse incentive
eﬀect. If u is strictly concave, increasing ct+1 by εRt+1 reduces the correlation between u(ct+1)
and productivity. This correlation exists to provide incentives; reducing the correlation means
that eﬀort and output both fall in period (t +1 ) .
Thus, lowering consumption in period t and raising consumption in period (t+1)has
3Actually, the analysis only implies that any optimal tax sequence must be consistent with (1); the analysis
leaves indeterminate the actual sequence of taxes necessary to generate (1). In particular, if it is possible to
use consumption taxes, any path of consumption and capital taxes consistent with (1) is optimal. Some of
these paths may feature negative capital taxes as long as consumption taxes are growing at a suﬃciently fast
rate.
Of course, this point is hardly unique to our paper. In particular, it applies to the original Chamley-Judd
analysis.
3an extra adverse eﬀect on incentives. In a social optimum, marginal social costs and the
marginal social beneﬁt are equated, which implies that the partial marginal cost u0(ct) is less
than the total marginal beneﬁt βRt+1Etu0(ct+1).4
We go on to reconsider the uniform commodity taxation theorem. We revert to the
general assumption of multiple consumption goods, and assume that utility is weakly sepa-
rable between consumption and labor. We prove that any Pareto optimal allocation has the
property that within a period, the marginal rate of substitution between any two consumption
goods, for any agent, equals the marginal rate of transformation between those goods. This
result implies that if agents can trade consumption goods in a spot market, all consumption
goods should be taxed uniformly.
The idea behind the proof of the uniform commodity taxation theorem is as follows.
Because utility is weakly separable, consumption only aﬀects the incentive constraints and
the planner’s objective function through the amount of sub-utility derived from consumption.
Hence, as long as resources are scarce, the planner wants to ﬁnd a way to deliver these sub-
utilities that minimizes the resource cost of doing so. This immediately implies the uniform
commodity taxation theorem.
We make two distinct contributions to public ﬁnance. The ﬁrst contribution is that
we ﬁnd a general role for positive capital income taxes in a Pareto optimum.5 Here, we ﬁnd
that thinking based only on representative agent models can be misleading. It is the dynamic
4See Kocherlakota (1998) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) for a similar intuition in a two-period
context.
5Aiyagari (1995) argues that positive capital income taxes are optimal in an incomplete markets setting.
However, he considers only steady-states, rules out markets in an ad hoc basis, and allows only for linear
taxes. In contrast, we consider all possible allocations that are feasible and incentive-compatible in a given
environment, and thus allow for all possible taxation schemes.
Garriga (2001) shows that in overlapping generations contexts, the optimal linear tax on capital income
may be non-zero.
4evolution of idiosyncratic shocks that makes positive capital income taxes optimal.
The second is that we greatly generalize the applicability of the uniform commodity
taxation theorem. The standard proof of this result is based on much stronger assumptions.
Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) argument is made in a setting without capital or informational
evolution. Moreover, the argument is made under restrictive assumptions: optimal taxes are
diﬀerentiable and a ﬁrst-order approach is valid. Both assumptions are typically satisﬁed
only under highly restrictive conditions. We simplify the proof and thereby greatly broaden
the range of environments to which it applies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the
class of model environments. In Section 3, we demonstrate the optimality of positive capital
income taxation. In Section 4, we generalize the uniform commodity taxation theorem. We
defer a complete discussion of the related literature until Section 5; the discussion clariﬁes
why we are able to prove our results in such generality. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Setup
The economy lasts for T periods, where T may be inﬁnity, and has a unit measure
of agents. The economy is endowed with K∗
1 units of the single capital good. There are J
consumption goods, which are produced by capital and labor at N diﬀerent tasks. The agents
have identical preferences. The preferences of a given agent are von Neumann-Morgenstern,




t−1U(ct,l t),1 > β > 0
5where ct ∈ RJ
+ is the agent’s consumption in period t, and l ∈ RN
+ is the amount of time spent
working in period t by the agent at the N diﬀe r e n tt a s k s .W ea s s u m et h a tU is bounded from
above or bounded from below; this guarantees that the utility from any consumption/labor
p r o c e s si sw e l l - d e ﬁned as an element of the extended reals.
The agents’ skills at the N diﬀerent tasks diﬀer across agents and over time. We model
this cross-sectional and temporal heterogeneity as follows. Let Θ be a Borel set in RN
+, and
let µ be a probability measure over the Borel sets that are subsets of ΘT. At the beginning
of time, an element θ
T of ΘT is drawn for each agent according to the measure µ; the draws
are independent across agents. This random vector θ
T is the agent’s type; its t-th component
θt is the agent’s skill vector in period t. We assume that a law of large numbers applies: the
measure of agents in the population with type θ
T in Borel set B is given by µ(B).
What makes the information problem dynamic is that a given agent privately learns
his θt at the beginning of period t and not before. Thus, at the beginning of period t, an
agent knows his history θ
t of current and past skill vectors but not his future skill vectors.
We represent this information structure formally as follows. Deﬁne Pt : ΘT → Θt to be the
projection operator: Pt(θ1,...,θT)=( θ1,...,θt). Then, deﬁne a σ-algebra Ωt = {P
−1
t (B)|B ⊂
ΘT is Borel}. An agent’s information evolution can then be represented by the sequence
(Ω1,Ω2,...,ΩT) of σ-algebras.
Notice that this stochastic speciﬁcation allows for virtually arbitrary dynamic evolu-
tion of an agent’s skills. For example, the agent’s skills could be constant over time (which
is the traditional public ﬁnance assumption). Alternatively, the skills could follow stationary
or nonstationary stochastic processes over time. The only real restriction is that the skill
processes are independent across agents.
6What is the economic impact of these skill vectors? An agent with type θt produces
eﬀective labor ynt in task n according to the function:
ynt = θntlnt
where lnt is the amount of time spent working at task n. Eﬀective labor ynt is observable, but
actual labor lnt is not.
Along with the consumption goods, there is an accumulable capital good. We deﬁne
an allocation in this society to be (c,y,K)=( ct,y t,K t+1)T










(ct,y t) is Ωt-measurable
Here, ynt(θ
T) is the amount of eﬀective labor at task n produced by a type θ
T agent in period
t, cjt(θ
T) is the amount of the jth consumption good given to a type θ
T agent in period t,
and Kt+1 is the amount of capital carried over from period t into period (t +1 ) .
Let G : RJ+2+N
+ → R be strictly increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable with respect
to its ﬁrst (J +1 )arguments, and strictly decreasing and continuously diﬀerentiable with
respect to its (J +2)th argument. This function tells us which vectors of capital input, labor
inputs and consumption outputs are technologically available. Speciﬁc a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a t
7the initial endowment of capital is K∗
















The ﬁrst requirement is that ct and yt be integrable for all t.
Because θ
T is unobservable, allocations must respect incentive-compatibility condi-
tions. A reporting strategy σ is a mapping from ΘT into ΘT such that for all t, σt is Ωt-











to be the utility from reporting strategy σ, given an allocation (c,y). Let σ∗ be the truth-
telling strategy (σ∗(θ
T)=θ
T for all θ
T). Then, an allocation (c,y,K) is incentive-compatible
if:
W(σ
∗;c,y) ≥ W(σ;c,y) for all σ in Σ
An allocation which is incentive-compatible and feasible is said to be incentive-feasible.6
We allow for the possibility that the planner weights agents diﬀerently based on their
6We restrict attention to direct mechanisms. By the Revelation Principle, this is without loss of generality.
As well, we restrict attention to mechanisms in which an individual’s consumption and output depend only
on his own announcements. This is without loss of generality because there is a continuum of agents with
independent shock processes.
8initial skill levels. Speciﬁcally, let χ1 : ΘT → R+ be Ω1-measurable, and suppose that
R
χ1dµ =1 . Then, we deﬁne the following programming problem, P1(K1), for an arbitrary
















ytdµ) ≤ 0 for all t
W(σ
∗;c,y) ≥ W(σ;c,y) for all σ in Σ
K1 given
ct ≥ 0,y t ≥ 0,K t ≥ 0 for all t and almost all θ
T















In the actual model economy, there are initially K∗
1 units of capital. Hence, the
planner’s problem is to solve P1(K∗
1). We assume throughout that there is a solution to
P1(K∗
1) and that |V ∗(K∗
1)| < ∞. Any solution to P1(K∗
1) is a Pareto optimum.7
Note that the planner’s maximized objective V ∗ is weakly increasing. In our analysis,
we will often require that V ∗ is strictly increasing. The following lemma shows that, under
a mild regularity condition, V ∗ is strictly increasing if U is additively separable between
consumption and leisure. (In the remainder of the paper, as is standard, we use the terms
7Speciﬁcally, any solution to P1(K∗
1) is interim Pareto optimal, conditional on the realization of θ1. If
χ =1 , the solutions to P1(K∗
1) are symmetric ex-ante Pareto optima.
9for almost all θ
T and almost everywhere (or a.e.) equivalently.)
Lemma 1. Let U(c,l)=u(c)−v(l),w h e r eu is strictly increasing and continuously diﬀeren-
tiable. Suppose that for any (c∗,y ∗,K∗) that solves P1(K∗
1), there exists some t and positive
scalars c+,c + such that c+ ≥ c∗
jt ≥ c+ a.e. for all j. Then, V ∗(K1) <V∗(K∗
1) for all K1 <K ∗
1.
Proof. In Appendix.
The proof of the lemma works as follows. Suppose the planner has not used up all
initial capital. Because utility is additively separable, the planner can distribute the extra
resources across agents so as to add the same amount of utility to every type. Thus, if initial
capital is not exhausted, the planner can construct a welfare-improving incentive-compatible
redistribution of the extra resources.
3. Capital Income Taxes
To obtain results about the intertemporal characteristics of optimal taxation, we sim-
plify the model. We set the number of consumption goods J =1 ,a n ds e t :
G(Ct,Y t,K t,K t+1)=Ct + Kt+1 − Kt(1 − δ) − F(Kt,Y t)
where F is strictly increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable in its ﬁrst argument. (These
restrictions on J and G do not apply in the next section.) Throughout the section, we assume
that the partial derivative Uc exists and is continuous in its ﬁrst argument over the positive
reals. We proceed by ﬁrst providing a partial characterization of Pareto optima, and then
establishing the implications of this characterization for capital income tax rates.
10A. Characterizing Pareto Optima
The main result in this section is a restriction on the intertemporal behavior of indi-
vidual consumption. The result is similar to (but much more general than) that derived by
Rogerson (1985a) for optimal contracts in relationships with repeated moral hazard.
We begin by stating the result. We use the notation E{.|Ωt} to denote the conditional
expectation operator.
Theorem 1. Let U(c,l)=u(c) − v(l). Suppose (c∗,y ∗,K∗) solves P1(K∗
1),a n dt h a tt h e r e
exist t<T and scalars c+,c + such that c+ ≥ c∗
t,c ∗
t+1,K∗
t+1 ≥ c+ > 0 a.e. Then:














The proof of the theorem runs roughly as follows. We know from Lemma 1 that
any solution (c∗,y∗,K∗) to P1(K∗
1) must also solve a dual problem, in which the planner
chooses an incentive-feasible allocation so as to minimize the initial resources necessary to
deliver a given ex-ante objective value. This implies, a fortiori, that (c∗,y ∗,K∗) must also
solve any version of the dual problem which has a strictly smaller constraint set that includes
(c∗,y ∗,K∗).
We construct a particular constraint set reduction. First, we ﬁx y∗. Then, we include













T)) for all θ
T
11Note the absence of any expectation operators: in words, we look at allocations (c0,K0) that
deliver the same ex-post lifetime utility as c∗ to all possible types θ
T. The crux of the proof
lies in showing that this is in fact a reduction of the constraint set - that is, in proving
that (c0,y ∗) is incentive-compatible. We can then derive the theorem by using the ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions to this version of the dual with a smaller constraint set.
It is important to note that even if θ
T is public information (so that there is no
incentive problem), Theorem 1 is still valid. In this case, full insurance is possible and u0(c∗
t)














Thus, the incentive problem does not create the restriction in Theorem 1.R a t h e r , t h e
incentive problem determines the variance of the marginal utility process that gets plugged
into the formula in Theorem 1.
This kind of thinking informs the next two corollaries. The ﬁrst concerns the (typical)
case in which u0(c∗
t) is not perfectly predictable.
Corollary 1. Let U(c,l)=u(c)−v(l). Suppose (c∗,y ∗,K∗) solves P1(K∗
1), and that there
exist t<Tand scalars c+,c + such that c+ ≥ c∗
t,c ∗
t+1,K∗
t+1 ≥ c+ > 0 a.e. Suppose also that
R
[Va r(u0(c∗














Proof. Simply apply Jensen’s inequality to the condition in Theorem 1.
12This corollary says that if u0(c∗
t+1) is not predictable given Ωt, the expected marginal
utility of investing in capital is higher than the marginal utility of current consumption. Note
that this lack of predictability is to be expected in general because the planner wants to elicit
high labor from high skill types.
It is interesting to contrast Corollary 1 with the results concerning optimal linear
taxation of capital and labor income in a representative agent economy. Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) prove for a general speciﬁcation of u that it is optimal in the long run to eliminate
the wedge between expected marginal utility of investing in capital and the marginal utility
of current consumption. Indeed, when u(c)=c1−σ/(1−σ), Chamley proves an even stronger
result: it is optimal for the wedge to be zero for all t, not just in the long run. In contrast, we
ﬁnd that for any speciﬁcation of u,a sl o n ga su0(c∗
t+1) is not predictable given Ωt, the wedge
in period t should be non-zero.
There are special circumstances in which the inequality in Corollary 1 becomes an
equality instead. In particular, if agents have ﬁxed skills over time, then the Pareto optimal
allocations display no wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the expected
marginal utility of investment.
Corollary 2. Suppose that µ(B) > 0 only if µ(B)=µ{θ
T ∈ B|θt = θ1 for all t}. Let
U(c,l)=u(c) − v(l). Suppose (c∗,y∗,K∗) solves P1(K∗
1), and that there exist t<Tand
scalars c+,c + such that c+ ≥ c∗
t,c ∗
t+1,K∗














This corollary follows from the fact that θt is perfectly predictable, given θ1. In fact,
13using a similar approach as in Theorem 1,w ec a np r o v e( a tl e a s tw h e nΘ is ﬁnite) that
even if preferences are non-separable between consumption and labor, we obtain a version of
Chamley-Judd’s classic result for this case of ﬁxed skills.
Proposition 1. Suppose T = ∞, Θ is ﬁnite, and that µ{θ
∞} > 0 iﬀ θt = θ1 for all t.
Suppose that V ∗(K1) <V∗(K∗
1) for all K1 <K ∗
1. Let a strictly positive allocation (c∗,y∗,K∗)
solve P1(K∗




t=1 converges to a






































n=1) for all θ1,ˆ θ1
Kt ∈ R+,c t ≥ 0 for all t








































n=1) for all θ1,ˆ θ1
It is clear that (c0,y∗,K0) is feasible; (c0,y∗) is incentive-compatible because we have kept
14the utility of all announcement/true type pairs the same. This allocation solves P1(K1), for
K1 <K ∗
1, which violates the assumption that V ∗ is strictly increasing.
Now, we can characterize (c∗,y ∗,K∗) using the ﬁrst order conditions to this problem.
Let λt be the multiplier on the period t feasibility constraint and let γ(θ1,ˆ θ1) be the multiplier
on the appropriate utility constraint.
Abusing notation slightly, we use µ(θ1) to denote µ{(θ1,θ1,θ1,...)}. Diﬀerentiating













where Uc is the partial derivative of U with respect to c. Diﬀerentiating with respect to Kt+1
we obtain:















This implies the proposition.
15B. Capital Trading and Capital Income Taxes
The above results concern the wedges (or lack thereof) between marginal rates of
substitution and transformation in Pareto optima. We now want to translate these results
about wedges into results about taxes. Many of the mechanisms that implement the Pareto
optimum operate by requiring agents to sign exclusive contracts with a planner or interme-
diary (see Prescott and Townsend (1984) or Atkeson and Lucas (1992)). In these kinds of
mechanisms, the implication for taxes is that agents should face an inﬁnite tax if they engage
in any side-trading of capital and consumption.
We instead allow agents to (non-exclusively) trade consumption and capital in a se-
quence of competitive markets. We prove that in this sequential markets setting, our previous
results about wedges translate directly into conclusions about capital income taxes (as long
as utility is additively separable). We assume throughout this subsection that F is strictly
concave in its ﬁrst argument, that T is ﬁnite, and that Θ is ﬁnite. (We believe, though, that
the results are robust to relaxing the latter two assumptions.)
We do not address the question of how to design a labor income tax schedule that
supports the socially optimal allocation. The obvious construction would involve setting
a marginal tax rate for each agent that equates his marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and time to his marginal rate of transformation. There are two problems with
this approach. The ﬁrst is that the resultant tax schedule may give rise to a non-convex
decision problem for the agent. This means that even though his ﬁrst order conditions are
satisﬁed by the social optimum, he may not ﬁnd it optimal to make choices consistent with
the social optimum.
The second problem is peculiar to the dynamic setting. It is conceivably optimal for
16the planner to condition an agent’s second period eﬀective labor on the agent’s report θ1, but
not condition the agent’s ﬁrst period eﬀective labor on that report. This would mean that
the tax schedule must be a function of reports, not of eﬀective labor.
For these reasons, it is useful to isolate our questions about optimal capital income
taxes from questions about optimal labor income taxes. To do so, we consider a class of
capital-trading mechanisms that work as follows. In each period, each agent makes a report
from the set Θ to a social planner. Based on the history of these reports, each agent receives
some amount of consumption as after-tax income and is told what vector of eﬀective labor
to provide.
Up until this point, the capital-trading mechanisms are standard direct mechanisms.
The diﬀerence is that agents need not consume their income processes. Instead, they can
exchange capital and consumption, and rent out capital services, in a sequence of competitive
markets. In each period, an agent faces a linear tax on his capital rental income; the tax rate
may be a function of his history of reports.
The other side of the capital rental market is assumed to be a single representative
ﬁrm. The ﬁrm is also partially centralized, because it is simply endowed with a sequence
of eﬀective labor which it cannot alter. However, the ﬁrm can freely rent capital from the
agents; ﬁrm proﬁts are split evenly among the agents in the economy.
Thus, under a capital-trading mechanism, labor and after-tax income are allocated
according to a direct mechanism. However, agents are allowed to engage in decentralized
trade in capital markets. The only restriction is that they face (possibly report-contingent)
tax rates on their capital income.











(zt,y t,τt+1) is Ωt-measurable
Here, we interpret z as an after-tax income process, y as an eﬀective labor process, and τ as
the tax rate on capital income. Thus, given (z,y,τ), and a rental rate sequence r ∈ RT
+,a
typical agent, initially endowed with K∗









s.t. ct + kt+1 ≤ kt(1 + rt(1 − τt(σ)) − δ)+zt(σ)





Note that agents take into account their ability to trade in the sequential capital markets
when they are making their reports about their types. Their after-tax incomes and their
capital income tax rates depend on their reports.
There is a representative ﬁrm which operates every period. Given y,a n dar e n t a lr a t e





i ne a c hp e r i o d . W ea s s u m et h a tﬁrm proﬁts are split evenly among the agents, and so are
embedded directly into zt.
Given a capital-trading mechanism (z,y,τ), (c,k,r,K) is a sequential markets equilib-
rium if it satisﬁes three conditions. First, (c,k,σ∗) solves the agent’s problem given (z,y,τ,r).
(Recall that σ∗ is the truth-telling strategy in Σ.) Second, K solves the ﬁrm’s problem, given
(y,r). Finally, markets clear in every period:
Z





We now prove two results about capital-trading mechanisms. Both require the as-
sumption that utility is additively separable. The ﬁrst result is that any incentive-feasible
allocation is a sequential markets equilibrium of some capital-trading mechanism. The key
to the result is that all agents, regardless of their type, have the same preferences over con-
sumption processes.
Proposition 2. Let U(c,l)=u(c) − v(l), where u0,−u00 > 0.S u p p o s e (c∗,y ∗,K∗) is
incentive-feasible and (c∗
t,K∗
t+1) > 0 for all t. Then, there exists (k,r,z,τ) such that (c∗,k,r,K∗)
is an equilibrium of a capital-trading mechanism (z,y∗,τ).
























t (1 + rt(1 − τt) − δ)
K is clearly optimal for the ﬁrm given the rental rate sequence r and the (aggregate) eﬀec-
tive labor sequence
R
ydµ. We need to show that (c∗,k∗) solves the agent’s problem given
(z,y∗,τ,r).










s.t. ct + kt+1 = kt(1 + rt(1 − τt(σ)) − δ)+zt(σ)
ct,k t+1 Ωt-measurable
ct ≥ 0,k t ≥ 0,k 1 = K
∗
1
We claim that the solution to this problem is to set kt = K∗
t and ct = c∗
t. The choice set is
convex. Clearly, these choices satisfy the agent’s intertemporal ﬁrst order conditions. They
also satisfy his ﬂow budget constraints because of the deﬁnition of zt(σ).
Now, which reporting strategy does the agent use? Conditional on any σ,t h ea g e n t
receives the allocation (c∗
t(σ),y ∗
t(σ)).B u t b e c a u s e (c∗,y ∗) is incentive-compatible, it is at
20least weakly optimal for the agent to choose σ∗.
Because (c∗,y ∗,K∗) is feasible, the sequential markets clear.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that when we optimize over incentive-feasible allocations
(as in Theorem 1), we are implicitly optimizing over capital-trading mechanisms. The fol-
lowing converse proposition shows that in any sequential markets equilibrium, the sign of the
capital income taxes is the same as the sign of the wedge between intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution and transformation.
Proposition 3. Let U(c,l)=u(c)−v(l), where u0,−u00 > 0. Suppose (c,k,r,K),k t > 0 for
all t, is a sequential markets equilibrium of a capital-trading mechanism (z,y,τ). Then:
(1 + FK(Kt+1,
Z
yt+1dµ)(1 − τt+1) − δ)=u
0(ct)/βE{u
0(ct+1)|Ωt}.





0(ct)=( 1 + rt+1(1 − τt+1) − δ)βE{u
0(ct+1)|Ωt}
which in turn implies the proposition.
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 with Corollary 1, we conclude that it is typically
Pareto optimal for capital income taxes to be positive.
214. Uniform Commodity Taxation
In this section, we prove the uniform commodity taxation theorem. We return to
the general setup described in the ﬁrst section (with multiple commodities and a general
production structure), except that we assume that utility is weakly separable:
U(c,l)=V (u(c),l),u : R
J
+ → R+
We also assume that u is strictly increasing and is continuously diﬀerentiable over the positive
orthant of RJ. The notation uj and Gj represents the partial derivatives of those functions
with respect to their jth arguments.
Theorem 2. Suppose V ∗(K1) <V∗(K∗
1) for all K1 <K ∗
1. Let (c∗,y ∗,K∗) solve P1(K∗
1) and
suppose that there exist some t and scalars c+,c + such that c+ >c ∗
jt(θ
T) >c + > 0 for all j
and for almost all θ

































for all j,k and almost all θ
T.
Proof. In Appendix.
Thus, in a Pareto optimum, the marginal rate of substitution between two consumption
goods is equalized to the marginal rate of transformation between those two goods. The key
to the proof is that the consumption goods enter both sides of the incentive constraints only
through the sub-utility u(c). Hence, it is optimal for the planner to deliver this sub-utility
22from consumption in a way that minimizes the resource cost of doing so.
Theorem 2 establishes a result about marginal rates of substitution and transformation.
However, we can follow the line of attack in Section 3B to translate it into a statement about
taxes. In particular, suppose agents can trade consumption goods in a competitive spot
market in each period. Then, Theorem 2 implies that it is suboptimal for them to face taxes
or subsidies in those markets that diﬀer across consumption goods.
5. Related Literature
A key property of the model is that the typical agent’s willingness to substitute between
consumption goods (within a period or over time) is public information. This aspect of
the model implies that it is useful to divide the prior literature into two groups of papers.
The ﬁrst group of papers analyze models in which agents have private information about
their willingness to substitute between consumption goods (over time or within a period).
We show below that our results do not extend into models of this kind. In contrast, the
second group of papers is like ours: it analyzes models in which the agents’ willingness to
substitute between consumption goods is common knowledge. Our results can be viewed as
(considerable) generalizations of those in this literature.
A. Privately Known Intertemporal MRS
There are now many papers on eﬃcient dynamic insurance in the presence of hidden
idiosyncratic shocks to endowments or marginal utilities of consumption (see, among others,
Townsend (1982), Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992),
Khan and Ravikumar (2001)). These kinds of shocks mean that a typical agent is privately
informed about his marginal rate of substitution between period t consumption and period
23(t +1 )consumption.
A key result that runs through this dynamic insurance literature is that in Pareto
optimal allocations, the typical agent’s shadow interest rate is no larger than the societal
shadow interest rate. This result is similar to our Corollary 1.
However, unlike our Corollary 1, the result from the dynamic insurance literature
depends crucially on the nature of the shock process to endowments or tastes. To see this
point, consider a two-period economy with a continuum of agents who have a utility function:
u(c1)+u(c2)
over sequences of consumption. The typical agent’s endowment is ((1 + θ),(1 + θ)2), where
θ is random with positive support; the endowments are private information. The society can
borrow and lend from an outside lender at a net rate of return r.
In this economy, agents with high ﬁrst-period endowments have high growth rates
of endowments. One can show that in an optimal allocation, agents’ shadow interest rates
are higher than r. Intuitively, with hidden endowments, the direction of the gap depends
on whether the agents who need insurance payments are more or less willing to substitute
current for future consumption.
In our model, we are able to implement socially optimal allocations using report-
contingent taxes (see Section 3B). This approach does not work when agents are privately
informed about their intertemporal marginal rates of substitution. To be concrete, again
consider a two-period setting with a continuum of agents who have a utility function u(c1)+
u(c2). The society faces an outside net rate of return r. In period 1, half of the agents receive an
24endowment θH, and half of the agents receive an endowment θL, where θH > θL. These ﬁrst-
period endowments are private information. All agents have endowments θ2 =( θH + θL)/2
in period 2.
In the Pareto optimal allocation, a type i agent receives a consumption stream (ci1,c i2),
where i = H,L. These streams must satisfy three conditions:
u
0(cH1)/u
0(cH2)=( 1 + r)
u
0(cL1)/u
0(cL2) > (1 + r)
u(cH1)+u(cH2)=u(θH − θL + cL1)+u(cL2)
The last equality is that the type H’s incentive constraint is satisﬁed with equality.
Can we implement a Pareto optimal allocation using a mechanism akin to that in
Section 3B? Suppose that an agent who announces i receives a sequence of transfers (ci1 −
θi,c i2 − θ2) and can borrow and lend at a rate ri = u0(ci1)/u0(ci2) − 1. Given that the agents
report truthfully, the borrowing-lending opportunity is constructed so that they will not
deviate. However:
u(cH1)+u(cH2)=u(θH − θL + cL1)+u(cL2)
< max
s u(θH − θL + cL1 − s)+u(cL2 +( 1+rL)s)
because u0(θH − θL + cL1)/u0(cL2) < (1 + rL). It is no longer optimal for type H’s to tell
the truth, once they are allowed to borrow and lend at a type-speciﬁc interest rate. So, the
allocation cannot be implemented using this kind of borrowing/lending mechanism.
25Why doesn’t this analysis apply to our framework? In our setup, agents’ true types
do not aﬀect their willingness to borrow and lend. Hence, if a type i doesn’t want to deviate
from a consumption scheme by borrowing and lending at rate ri,t h e nn oo t h e rt y p ej will
either.
B. Publicly Known Intertemporal MRS
As mentioned above, in our paper, agents’ intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
are publicly known. There are many other papers which also adopt this modelling strategy.
For example, Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, 1986) consider a special case of our general setup.
In their model, agents are long-lived and can be disabled or not. Disabled agents are un-
productive; able agents have known productivities. Once disabled, the agent stays disabled;
the probability of an able agent becoming disabled is exogenous. The informational problem
is that the disability status of the agent is known only to the agent. Diamond and Mirrlees
prove that in the social optimum, the shadow societal interest rate is higher than the private
shadow interest rate. They argue explicitly that this result implies that capital income taxa-
tion is socially optimal. Our contribution over their work is that we generalize their positive
capital income taxation result to a much larger class of individual skills processes.
There are several papers on the properties of eﬃcient allocations in the presence of
repeated moral hazard (see, among others, Rogerson (1985a), Phelan and Townsend (1991),
Phelan (1994)). Again, in these settings the optimal allocations have the property that agents’
shadow interest rates are higher than the societal shadow interest rate. The intuition behind
this result is essentially the same as that behind Corollary 1. However, in this literature, the
idiosyncratic output shocks are restricted to be independently and identically distributed; we
26instead allow for a much wider range of skill processes.
We were originally motivated to write this paper by the work of da Costa and Werning
(2001). They examine optimal monetary policy in two models (a cash-credit good framework
and a shopping-time setup) in which agents are privately informed about their ﬁxed skills.
In the cash-credit good framework, da Costa and Werning prove that if preferences are
weakly separable between consumption and leisure, then the Friedman Rule (zero nominal
interest rates) is socially optimal. This is essentially an implication of the uniform commodity
taxation theorem, and so we conjecture that this result could be established in our more
general setup. They also consider how deviations from weak separability of preferences aﬀect
optimal monetary policy.
In a paper written at the same time as ours, but independently, Werning (2001)
analyzes the properties of optimal capital income taxes in a model economy with unobservable
and heterogeneous ﬁxed skills. Like us (Corollary 2), he ﬁnds that it is optimal for capital
income taxes to be zero in this setting.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal taxation when individual skills
are unobservable, evolve stochastically over time, and are multi-dimensional. We show that
when utility is weakly separable between consumption and leisure, it is optimal to equate
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods for any agent to the marginal
rate of transformation between those goods. It follows that Pareto optimal allocations are
consistent with uniform taxation of all consumption goods.
We consider the intertemporal structure of optimal taxation when there is only a sin-
27gle consumption good and utility is additively separable between consumption and leisure.
In this case, if the optimal allocation requires future consumption to be random given cur-
rent information, then individuals face distorted consumption paths. We show that these
distortions are consistent with the presence of positive capital income taxes.
Given additive separability of preferences between consumption and labor, the uniform
commodity taxation theorem is generally valid, but the zero capital income taxation theorem
is generally not. The reason for this distinction is that over time, individuals are acquiring
information about their types. It is this idiosyncratic uncertainty that generates positive
capital income taxes. In particular, if individuals knew their entire sequence of skills in
period 1, then we could use exactly the same reasoning as in Theorem 2 (or Corollary 2) to
conclude that Pareto optimal allocations are consistent with zero capital income taxation.
We are able to prove the theorems in a highly general setting. We allow for a multi-
dimensional speciﬁcation of skills. Individual skills are independent over a continuum of
individuals but follow arbitrary stochastic processes over time. Nonetheless, it is possible to
push this generality still further: We can allow any additional private information as long
as individuals’ willingness to substitute consumption over time is common knowledge. This
means, for example, that we could allow agents to secretly accumulate human capital, and
thereby endogenize skills.
The paper abstracts from government purchases. This is merely for notational conve-
nience. The results can be easily extended to two kinds of model economies with government
purchases. The ﬁrst is one in which per-capita government purchases are a deterministic
stream that the government must fund using taxes. The second is one in which government
purchases are a choice variable for the social planner. In both kinds of models, the results
28are all valid regardless of how government purchases aﬀect production or enter preferences.
29Appendix
In this appendix, we collect the proofs of the main results.
A1. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose V ∗(K1)=V ∗(K∗
1) for some K1 <K ∗
1. Let (c∗,y∗,K∗) solve P1(K1) and
also P1(K∗
1). Without loss of generality, assume that c∗
1 satisﬁes the uniform boundedness
conditions. Deﬁne c0
11(θ










T)) = ε for all θ
T
for ε nonnegative. Here, c0
11(θ
T,ε) is the amount of consumption good 1 that gives a type
θ
T agent ε more utiles than c∗
1. Clearly, c0
11 is Ω1-measurable with respect to θ
T,a n di s
continuous with respect to ε.
















where u1 is the partial of u with respect to its ﬁrst argument. From the regularity conditions







T)| <Mε for ε small
Hence, for ε small, c0
11(θ
T,ε) is integrable as a function of θ
T. Moreover, adding ε to initial
consumption is feasible for initial capital K∗






























































which proves that (c0,y ∗) is incentive-compatible (the inequality is implied by the incentive-
compatibility of (c∗,y ∗)). It follows that (c∗,y∗) cannot be a solution to P1(K∗
1).
A2. A Technical Lemma
We use the following notation:
L
∞(Ωt)={x Ωt-measurable|∃A ∈ Ωt such that sup
θT∈A
|x| < ∞, and µ(A)=1 }
Let ||.|| denote the usual ess-sup norm on L∞(Ωt).
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 use two technical results. The ﬁrst is Theorem 1,
p. 243 of Luenberger (1969). This theorem assumes that in an optimization problem with
equality constraints, the objective and constraints are continuously Frechet diﬀerentiable in
31the neighborhood of a local optimum. It then proves that this local optimum must satisfy
analogs of the usual Lagrangian ﬁrst-order conditions.
The second key result is the following lemma. It establishes that as long as c∗
t is
bounded from above and below, the constraints in the minimization problems in the proofs
of Theorems 1 and 2 are deﬁned by a function that is continuously Frechet diﬀerentiable in
an e i g h b o r h o o do fc∗
t.
Lemma 2. Let u : R+ → R be C1 and let c∗
t be an element of L∞(Ωt). Suppose there exist
scalars c+ and c+ such that c+ ≥ c∗




Then U is continuously Frechet diﬀerentiable in a neighborhood of c∗
t.
Proof. Note that u0 is uniformly continuous over the interval [c+/2,3c+/2]. Let {∆nt}∞
n=1 be














































The ﬁrst step follows from the mean value theorem and the last step from the uniform
continuity of u0 over [c+/2,3c+/2].
It follows that in a neighborhood of c∗
t, the Frechet derivative of U is well-deﬁned
and given by U0(ct)(∆)=u0(ct)∆ for all ∆ in L∞(Ωt). The norm of this linear operator is
given by ||u0(ct)||. Let ||ct − c∗
t|| <c +/2 and let {∆nt}∞
n=1 be a sequence in L∞ such that
limn→∞||∆nt|| =0 . Then:
lim
n→∞||u
0(ct + ∆nt) − u
0(ct)|| =0
because u0 is uniformly continuous over [c+/2,c +/2+c+/2]. So U is continuously Frechet
diﬀerentiable in a neighborhood of c∗
t.
We can now turn to the proof of Theorems 1 and 2.
A3. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof has two distinct parts.
Part 1: Constructing a Minimization Problem
In the ﬁrst part of the proof, we construct a particular class of two-period deviations
from the candidate optimum. The class of possible deviations satisﬁes two requirements.
First, the deviations are required to deliver the same utility to all types as does the candidate
optimum. Second, the deviations are required to satisfy resource-feasibility in all periods.
Obviously, the ﬁrst requirement means that all of these deviations provide the same
33objective value to the planner. As well, the ﬁrst requirement implies that all of the devia-
tions are incentive-compatible. Hence, we now have a necessary condition for the candidate
optimum: it must use fewer initial resources than any of these possible deviations.
































t + ηt ≥ 0,c
∗
t+1 + εt+1 ≥ 0 ,K
∗




The objective of this problem is to minimize the resources used in period t. The ﬁrst constraint
requires that feasibility be satisﬁed in period (t+1). The second constraint requires that utility
to all types be kept the same under the deviation plan as under the candidate optimum.
We claim that MIN1 is solved by setting (ηt,εt+1,ζt)=0 . Suppose not, and that
t h e r ee x i s t ss o m ee l e m e n t(ηt,εt+1,ζt) of the constraint set which generates a negative value
















T)) for all θ
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We claim that (c0,y ∗,K0) is incentive-feasible, delivers the same value of the planner’s





































T)) for all θ
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(not just θ





























































This means that for any σ, agents get the same utility from c0 as from c∗. It follows that












































The inequality comes from the fact that (c∗,y ∗) is incentive-compatible.
Hence, (c0,y ∗,K0) uses fewer resources, is incentive-compatible, and delivers the same
value of the objective to the planner. This violates Lemma 1. We can therefore characterize
(c∗,K∗) using the ﬁrst order conditions of MIN1.
Part 2: Deriving the First Order Conditions
The second part of the proof is purely technical: in it, we verify that the theorem’s
implication is in fact a ﬁrst-order condition for MIN1.
Suppose we enlarge the constraint set by dropping the non-negativity constraints.
The non-negative orthant of L∞(Ωt) has a non-empty interior. Hence, 0 must also be a local
minimum of the enlarged minimization problem without the non-negativity constraints.
Note that the Frechet derivative U0(c∗
t) maps L∞(Ωt) onto L∞(Ωt).H e n c e ,(0,0,0) is
a regular point of the constraint set. From Lemma 2 and Luenberger (1969; Theorem 1, page
36243), we can conclude that there exist z∗
t+1 ∈ L∞∗(Ωt+1) (the dual of L∞(Ωt+1)) and λ
∗
t ∈ R




















(Here, as is standard, we use the notation hz,ui to denote the result of applying a linear
operator z to the random variable u.) In other words:
1 − λ
∗
































































































y1Adµ for all A in Ωt. Theorem
1 follows.
A4. Proof of Theorem 2
We proceed much as in the proof of Theorem 1. Again, we construct a particular class
of deviations from the candidate optimum. In particular, we focus on deviant allocations
that deliver the same sub-utility in all states as the optimal allocation.
















s.t. ct ∈ L
∞(Ωt)
s.t. ct ≥ 0 a.e.
Suppose not. Then, there exists a nonnegative c0


















T)) for all θ










T) for all θ
T not in A. Let c00 =( c00
t,c ∗
−t).


















Thus, (c00,y∗,K∗) also solves P1(K∗
1). However, because G is strictly increasing in Kt+1,
and strictly decreasing in Kt,t h e r ee x i s t sK0 such that (c00,y ∗,K0) solves P1(K1) for some
K1 <K ∗
1. But this means that V ∗(K1)=V ∗(K∗
1) which is a contradiction.
Thus, c∗ solves the above minimization problem. The rest of the proof is simply
technical: establishing that the solution to the minimization problem satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions in the theorem.
Note that Lemma 2 can easily be extended to the case in which c∗
t is a ﬁnite-dimensional
random vector. As in the proof of Theorem 1, if we drop the non-negativity constraints from
the minimization problem, we know that c∗
t is a local minimum in the resulting problem,
and that it is a regular point in the constraint set. From Lemma 2, and Luenberger (1969;
Theorem 1, p. 243), we know that there exists z∗
t ∈ L∞∗(Ωt) such that c∗
t is a stationary
























































































































0dµ for all ∆
0 in L
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